The Wedge—Chapter 5 of Secret Autobiography
5.
The wedge
It can't be 'our' 'happiness.'
Because that conceptualizing is a social uniformity where the individual
is transformed in order 'to appear' oneself and also the same as the
crowd (at once).
One's own appearance is as
outside only, inside having been consumed by the worm-pod-flower.
Destroys the inside of others &—by displacing 'one's' experiencing and 'one's' theorizing that
both.
quot;I am the business"
is said by the Replicant who learns her identity having thought she
was human (in Blade Runner). 'Not recognizing that one is constructed'
is the capitalist-business. It displaces actual outside event, redefining
history, obliterating those past and current events.
So Secret Autobiography
has to be not outside event, not a life's chronological events,
and not one's imagining-thought-conceptualizing event mind-phenomena
(as that is only 'oneself')—it's event that 'doesn't come from
one's mind' but as comes from one's mind. You replace any event not
creating it. What is 'not imposition' (any event being
imposition as such) isn't between these even—but 'not imposition'
can be. And as this is conceptual, all events in it could only occur
from the mind of one.
Secret Autobiography is
not the constructed self, or constructed mind (as its operations even,
which are, though, creating the writing). Nor is it the phenomena
(subject) by itself.
The ripping off of the colony ('its'
definition), the occupied people being defined exteriorly as members
'of' the whole (yet marginalized 'to' that 'the only world'), the
colonized's wealth stolen and shipped to the 'parent' (military invader)
while 'its' (colonized) people are being executed, replaced, shipped
to labor camps—still executed—language replacing them
defining the events according to the defined outside version—their resources mined, they are replaced with occupying workers (invaders)
who own the stores and towns and work the resources that are being
shipped away. So there is no work either, for the occupied.
The occupied are regarded as uncivilized,
not-human. They (these others) are more than human in the sense of
being outside of their lives as conceptual-physiological—they
theorize themselves as 'outside of construction by being constructed
only', seeing being constructed continually.
In waking at night ('state' in)
terror that one (young adult) 'hadn't lived' 'was not living' then
at that instant at night (it is impossible to do so ever) before terror
is subject to the experience there—the experience is something
else.
The exterior and interiorized event
both is unformed only (by one?)—nor is terror a cause of it
(is before it, after it).
That 'it's not causal' is characteristic
of terror—it may not have an effect on 'crowds that are in
violence so it's outside one while one's there.'
If one's liked that's a 'thing'
itself. Others are re-formed to like one, if one's doing that.
quot;That's what it is to be a
slave." 'But the only way of being outside.' In total change,
the butterfly has no memory as it's structurally totally different.
In the one who experienced this (total structural change) there is
still terror, or isn't?
Eating a mango—language
isn't existing, at all, and that only as text. Here. 'Written' is
secret. Vision occurs by it being written. Not spoken (spoken is 'public')—yet it is also 'public' later by being unspoken, in the sense
of that which is 'unspeakable' but is occurring 'there'.
In being pressed the spinal cord
memorized pain (that is thoughts), still feels that pain when the
'source' is gone. Memory is one being both the one eating and the
one being eaten at once while the butterfly and its worm are at once,
superimposed as each other, only. Throughout one entirely then.
Is dying, only. (So that can't
be. One isn't the occurrence of 'dying, only.' That is felt by one,
when living, but it can't be 'dying only') Relation of 'the inside
of the inside' to dying—or 'the outside to one' to dying.
It's qualified everywhere. Eating
the mango. Seeing T singing.
Someone else saying to me, because
this does not have the ground that he accepts, which is the very ground
I'm trying to reverse, it cannot be regarded as valid (he says it's
"too fast"), "isn't qualified." And I can only
'reverse it' by not having any of its terms, thus told one can't speak
there because it's not the same thing.
One wouldn't seek to engage terror,
that would anyway be a conception that is the experience then, one
only doing so when one is in that—yet if one actually seeks
not to, it may be also that one precludes that event, but only that
one doesn't know that then. He is separating himself, objectifying
so there is nothing seen except the way he plots something.
I was going to say that I won't
do this any more because people don't like it—How? (in reference
to them).
A barrier of language is there
(indicated by the man taking issue with my mixing 'discursive' with
'poetic' as if fact is different from 'writing'—his basis of
fact) as that which is 'only that is' credible—when one is
speaking as logic at all.
It seems to be mirroring his, unintentionally.
I don't know his until it's there. He discounts mine automatically.
I do have to seek his, in order to change it in the outside
by it's being written.
One's to engage as format 'thought'
as the declaration socially that that is 'thought.' Though to question
that would be 'thought'.
Alice attempts to apply imperial
England's logic continually to interpret what's going on in Wonderland.
It's the same as applying imperial England's logic. Opposite is compatible.
(In Alice's scheme also, as here.)
One stream 'opposing' another stream,
streams are simultaneous, to be dis-placing all. The conception of
'an outside-culture'—is used as a wedge. Nagarjuna's logic*,
for example, is such a wedge: the outside-culture is space which displaces
itself. Only. It displaces here also. It could be a way to dismantle
us, to displace any interior construct (any construct being rigidity
now).
'Conceptual' is 'appearance' and
the 'interior being' of a culture, and instructions in the chromosomes.
'Conceptual' occurs by being cues, but is not the same as these cues.
Frightened (young) at early recognition,
which was—one 'theorized "every instance has to die"
'—later becomes, 'have to travel continually, not return to
anything or repeat—as have to die'—is one's introduction
of change now.
This interior change in one can't
be, isn't, arrived at mechanistically. That is, isn't duplication.
There's only actions now—and thus terror is 'there are no actions
in the present moment or ever'—even while these are occurring
in life.
As here we can only do anything
at all with humor—if it isn't funny, it's unhappy—that's
unhappy to think—it's not right tonally, in fact. So
if one's inner life is to transmogrify in any instant—everyone—is 'unintentionally' 'as one's inner life' disingenuous?
There (the foreign place or concept used as a wedge) wouldn't
be.
The flaneur, the detached stroller,
no longer exists. Instead, individuals on all economic and class levels
at once are both seeing and creating the interaction that is them:
which is then exterior, is 'society' (that is, the illusion
of simultaneity). Media 'fosters' and is this appearance. Geographical
land/location is also physiological-conceptual 'seen' both as a product
owned by people and a landscape in which people transpire—thus
seen simultaneously as an origin of people (but it isn't). "Dependent
origination" itself (that occurrences are interactive, have no
independent being, as described by Nagarjuna) is itself illusion.
(Nagarjuna's logic would concur with this.)
In other words, social phenomena
'seem to' 'transpire'—and that 'seeming' is itself the origin
of other events.
*Example, interpretation of Nagarjuna's
logic: roses only qualify the rose horizon. As such they are
two separate things: in that anything seen 'from' oneself is only
in that one moment (which isn't existing either, that moment or oneself
then), is 'only' 'composed'. The roses are not related to a rose horizon
inherently, in that they are dependent on one seeing them in that
way at an instant.
One also doesn't exist 'as that,'
not inherent as that one seeing (who is not separate in memory, but
is dependent on that instant existence of the roses). An occurrence
is not separate in existence, is then inherently empty in not having
any instant—yet the occurrence appears to be transpiring.
